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Abstract: In modern democratic consumer societies, decentralized, participative, and consensus-
oriented forms of multi-stakeholder governance are supplementing, and often replacing, conventional
forms of state-centered environmental government. The engagement in all phases of the policy
process of diverse social actors has become a hallmark of environmental good governance. This does
not mean to say, however, that these modes of policy-making have proved particularly successful in
resolving the widely debated multiple sustainability crisis. In fact, they have been found wanting
in terms of their ability to respond to democratic needs and their capacity to resolve environmental
problems. So why have these participatory forms of environmental governance become so prominent?
What exactly is their appeal? What do they deliver? Exploring these questions from the perspective
of eco-political and sociological theory, this article suggests that these forms of environmental
governance represent a performative kind of eco-politics that helps liberal consumer societies
to manage their inability and unwillingness to achieve the socio-ecological transformation that
scientists and environmental activists say is urgently required. This reading of the prevailing policy
approaches as the collaborative management of sustained unsustainability adds an important dimension
to the understanding of environmental governance and contemporary eco-politics more generally.
Keywords: environmental governance; performance; politics of unsustainability; eco-political
disability; simulative politics
1. Introduction
In modern capitalist consumer democracies, traditional centralized top-down approaches to
environmental policy-making have been supplemented, indeed often replaced, by decentralized,
flexible, and participatory network approaches. In addition to state agencies, they engage
scientific experts, NGOs, market actors, civil society organizations, and a range of other relevant
stakeholders [1–3]. As these new modes of collaborative governance have become fully mainstreamed,
conventional forms of prescriptive, interventionist, top-down environmental politics have become
increasingly unpopular and are now actually often perceived as authoritarian. Since the 1990s,
in particular, the modern state is expected to play the role of a coordinator and facilitator in eco-politics,
but not to unilaterally issue and impose regulations [4,5]. Flexible and consensus-seeking forms of
environmental governance are commonly presented as more democratic than traditional interventionist
approaches. They are said to take into account that governments are no longer the only (nor the
most important) political actor and source of authority, that in an increasingly complex world,
environmental problems have multifaceted causes and implications that can only be addressed
through constructive collaboration of diverse stakeholders [6], and that contemporary citizens are more
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determined than ever to move beyond sheer protesting and mobilizing to actually doing, changing, and
impacting [7]. Furthermore, modern environmental governance is also said to increase the efficiency
and effectiveness of environmental policy-making [8]. It is commonly assumed that cooperative,
consensual, voluntary approaches help to reduce conflicts of interest and to engage even those actors,
which might otherwise oppose environmental policies or obstruct their effective implementation [9,10].
Thus, even though very recently—in the wake of right-wing populist movements, parties,
and governments, in particular—a certain resurgence of less participatory and often anti-environmental
forms of policy-making may signal the emergence of a new post-governance era, environmental
governance is, for the time being, a fully mainstreamed, almost hegemonic “mature paradigm” [11].
Yet, following a phase of considerable optimism during the 1990s and into the new millennium,
the proliferation of collaborative modes of environmental governance has also attracted strong criticism.
As regards their democratic quality, it has been argued that these forms of environmental governance
are neither inclusive nor egalitarian because in most cases governments determine who qualifies as
a stakeholder and is admitted into the policy network [12]. Thus, these modes of decision-making
selectively empower only some actors, who do not have a democratic mandate and who can also
not be held accountable by the electorate. Furthermore, as governments not only control which
actors are allowed to participate but commonly also set the agenda and the rules of engagement,
these forms of governance have been described as post-democratic and post-political: They are
set up to facilitate collaboration and consensus and, therefore, systematically eclipse all matters of
fundamental disagreement and potentially irreconcilable conflict [13,14]. They tightly restrict the
boundaries of what can be negotiated as well as the terms of negotiation, and issues are framed in
ways that only allow for pragmatic and viable solutions that may be implemented within the realm
of the currently possible. Hence, participatory forms of governance may contribute to the political
representation of diverse social interests and help pacify mounting societal conflicts, yet, rather than
genuinely empowering citizens, they often only co-opt them, mobilize them as an additional resource
for the legitimation and stabilization of the established order [15–17], and thus potentially even
reinforce the much-debated erosion of trust in democratic institutions and procedures [18–20].
In terms of their ecological problem-solving capacity, it has been noted that, although flexible
actor networks, citizen empowerment, stakeholder engagement, the co-production of knowledge,
etc. may, at the local and regional level, in particular, help to devise policies which are acceptable
to all stakeholders involved [9,21,22], their proliferation has, as yet, not taken modern consumer
societies much closer to the great socio-ecological transformation that many scientists and activists
say is urgently required, if major social and ecological disasters are to be avoided [23–25]. In fact,
the environmental and climate crisis continues to become ever more critical—not least, perhaps,
because the prevailing forms of decentralized and collaborative governance are explicitly designed
not to disrupt the established order and are, therefore, structurally unable to deliver the kind of
change that scientists and environmental movements demand. Moreover, in the recent literature,
democratic procedures and the modern state’s democratic legitimation imperative are themselves,
increasingly, seen as a part of the problem rather than the solution to the multiple sustainability
crisis [26–29]. Based on the argument that citizens have a “right to competent government” [30] (p. 140),
there are strong demands again for more epistocratic and expertocratic forms of policy-making [31,32],
and there is a notable new interest in environmental authoritarianism [33,34].
Drawing on the distinction between the democratic performance (ability to deliver to specifically
democratic needs) and the systemic performance (practical problem-solving capacity) of particular forms
of government [35,36], the prevailing modes of participatory environmental governance may, therefore,
be said to be not very satisfactory in either respect. Despite being widely portrayed as constitutive to
environmental good governance, these forms of decentralized, participatory policy-making, in fact,
seem rather deficient. So why have they, nevertheless, become so prominent? Exactly what is their
appeal for modern consumer societies? In what respects are they good?
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These questions may be answered in a number of ways, some of which have already been
touched upon. In what follows, we propose that these new modes of environmental governance
have become so prominent because they actually correspond very closely to the particular dilemmas,
preferences, and needs of contemporary consumer societies—notably the desire to sustain particular
lifestyles and understandings of freedom and self-realization, which are known to be socially and
ecologically destructive (unsustainable). If measured by the democratic expectations and eco-political
demands of the more radical social movements of the past few decades, the performance of these
collaborative forms of governance may, indeed, be found wanting. As regards the socio-ecological
transformation that scientists say is required to ward off major catastrophes [24,25], their potential
may not be very promising either. Yet, if assessed from the perspective of these contemporary
dilemmas, preferences, and needs, they do actually perform exceptionally well. More specifically,
they provide contemporary consumer societies with a practical policy mechanism that helps them
to reconcile the widely perceived seriousness and urgency of socio-environmental problems with
their ever more visible inability and unwillingness to deviate from their established societal order,
patterns of self-realization and logic of development. Put differently, the prevailing collaborative
forms of environmental governance are highly effective tools for managing a condition that is widely
perceived as pathological, but which (post-)industrial consumer societies neither can nor perhaps
really want to cure: the politics of unsustainability [37–39].
Thus, rather than thinking in terms of performance deficits or performance gaps [40], we are
suggesting that decentralized and participatory forms of governance may have become so prevalent
precisely because they help to avoid a structural transformation of modern societies, while, at the
same time, being uniquely suited to the articulation and experience—i.e., the performance—of
genuine commitment to comprehensive socio-ecological change. This unorthodox interpretation
of environmental governance and of performance does not seek to make any normative defense of
policy approaches that, quite evidently, do not deliver structural socio-ecological change. However,
it seeks to shed light on a dimension of eco-politics which neither the mainstream environmental
policy literature nor the critical governance literature [12–14]—the latter thinking mainly in terms of
insufficiencies and failures of governance approaches—really touch upon. Trying to spell out what these
policy approaches do deliver and why they are perceived as good, our line of inquiry makes a positive
and significant contribution to the understanding of environmental governance and contemporary
eco-politics more generally.
As the notion of performance plays a pivotal role in our analysis of environmental governance,
we begin by differentiating various understandings of this concept, drawing particular attention
to performance in the sense of simulative politics [41]. In order to retain a focus on actual empirical
practices, Section 3 then applies these different understandings of performance to specific examples of
environmental governance. This flags up, inter alia, problems and dilemmas that are distinctive of
eco-politics in contemporary consumer societies. Section 4 further explores these dilemmas from a
theoretical point of view and elaborates the argument that modern forms of environmental governance,
as practices of simulative politics, may be interpreted as closely responding to them. The concluding
section reflects on the potentials and limitations of interpreting environmental governance as the
collaborative management of sustained unsustainability.
2. Notions of Performance
There is no shortage of attempts to assess the “performance of participatory and collaborative
governance” [22]. Yet the suggestion that their striking proliferation may usefully be analyzed
in terms of performance in the above-mentioned sense and might easily conjure up simplistic,
moralizing condemnations of environmental governance as merely performative rather than
substantive, genuinely committed and effective. Some preliminary reflection on different
understandings of performance may be helpful to swiftly move beyond such one-dimensional
assessments. To begin with, there is the distinction between performance as measuring (a) fitness
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for purpose or ability to deliver to meet expectations and (b) performance in the theatrical sense, i.e.,
as presentation, display, or enactment. For the analysis of environmental governance, both these
meanings are relevant. In Figure 1 below, they are coded as Type A and Type B. The first one focuses
on the output (effectiveness) of a tool or process in relation to defined expectations, and covers
the efficiency of delivery, i.e., the relationship between the required inputs and delivered outputs.
As participatory forms of environmental governance are said to deliver to both democratic objectives
and in terms of practical solutions to environmental problems, their fitness for purpose—and,
conversely, potential performance deficits or performance gaps—can be assessed, as signaled above,
for both their democratic (Type A1) and their systemic (Type A2) performance.Sustainability 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 5 of 17 
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When it comes to performance in the theatrical sense (Type B), there again are different ways in
which the term may be used, and again all of them are applicable to the analysis of environmental
governance. Firstly, there are two v rieties of what may b ref rred to as symbolic politics (B1). One of
them entails strateg es of deception and manipulation, normally by power elites, who are making
false promis s and take forms of action that are known to be inadequate for their declared purpose
but serve th interests of decision-makers or their particular clie tele (B1.1). This understanding of
performance implies a moral judgement based on the assumption that decision-makers consciously
act against the public interest, knowingly take ineffective policy choices, and avoid alternative courses
of action which would be more effective and in the public interest. This kind of deceptive action is
often described as window-dressing and fake, and criticized as symbolic [42] as opposed to genuine,
authentic, and effective politics.
The second variety of symbolic politics does not have moral overtones but recognizes that in
environmental politics, as elsewhere, political goals, visions, and ideals (e.g., to protect a healthy
environment or the integrity of eco-systems) are often abstract and intangible and cannot easily,
or immediately, be translated into practical policies. Performative action then may help to articulate
commitment, to make an abstract goal more imaginable, or to generate and maintain political
momentum for its longer-term pursuit (B1.2). Rather than being in any way sinister, manipulative,
deceptive, or immoral, this form of symbolic politics is prefigurative and anticipatory [43,44] and
often indispensable in order to forge a political consensus and to encourage cooperation between
diverse actors.
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In addition to this, and most importantly for the purposes of the present analysis, performative
forms of action may also respond to conditions where commitments are serious and authentic but
cannot be implemented, be it for structural reasons or because individual actors and societies at large
have multiple values and commitments that are all equally genuine but cannot be fulfilled at the
same time. In order to distinguish this kind of performative action from symbolic politics (in both
its deceptive and the anticipatory variety), it has been conceptualized as simulative politics (B2) [41].
In such cases, performative action may help to cope with complexities, paradoxes, and dilemmas
that cannot be resolved but still must be addressed. As in the case of symbolic politics that helps to
visualize the unimaginable (B1.2), this form of performative action is not intended to avoid any more
effective and moral—yet inconvenient—alternative. In fact, in either scenario, such alternatives are
simply not available. Moreover, in either case, performative action is not based on the unequal social
distribution of power. Nevertheless, this latter kind of performance still does entail an element of
deception or illusioning. However, in contrast to the malicious deception of citizens by self-interested
elites, such practices might suitably be described as voluntary self-deception or self-illusioning (B2.1).
In conditions of high societal complexity, in particular, where citizens—and political actors more
generally—have to cope with an overload of demands, which may well be incompatible with each
other and very disorienting, practices of simulative politics perform a social reality, or construct societal
narratives, reducing complexity (B2.2) [45]. Such practices help individuals—and society at large—to
make sense of their paradoxical experience and manage irresolvable dilemmas. Figure 1 provides an
overview of these different notions of performance.
This typology of varieties of performance provides the conceptual tools required to move beyond
both 1) the simplistic celebration of new forms of environmental governance as a promising strategy
for increasing the legitimacy, efficiency, and effectiveness of environmental policy and 2) their equally
simplistic rejection as post-democratic, post-political, and eco-politically ineffective. Of course,
there are good examples demonstrating that the now prevalent arrangements of environmental
governance actually can deliver effective solutions for certain problems (A1, A2). Moreover, there are in
many instances good reasons to criticize the use of stakeholder engagement as window-dressing and a
strategic tool for postponing or obstructing policy measures that would be ecologically more effective
but are not in the interest of specific stakeholders (B1.1). However, for explaining the particular appeal
of these collaborative arrangements and their proliferation in liberal democratic consumer societies,
additional, and more sophisticated, tools are required.
Arguably, the reading of performance in the sense of simulative politics (B.2) is particularly helpful
in this respect. It has significant potential to reveal something that neither the mainstream perspective
nor the analyses by the critical governance literature manage to capture. For, in today’s neoliberal
consumer societies, these new forms of environmental governance are, arguably, centrally important
practices facilitating the politics of unsustainability: They allow maximum space for the preservation
of the unsustainable, yet apparently non-negotiable, values, freedom, and way of life [38,46] while
providing optimal opportunities for the articulation and experience of deeply felt socio-ecological
values and commitments. Thus, the prevailing forms of environmental governance may be said
to deliver in that they address the dilemma that liberal consumer societies are lacking the will
and ability to resolve their multiple sustainability crisis, but fully acknowledge that this crisis is
more real and urgent than ever before. Governance is good in that the collaborative management of
sustained unsustainability is facilitated. Before further theorizing this dilemma and the politics
of unsustainability, we first apply the conceptual lens(es) distinguished here to actual practices
of environmental governance. In looking at these empirical cases, the objective is not to provide
an in-depth analysis of the respective policy settings and outcomes but to illustrate the analytical
potential of the multidimensional concept of performance. In Section 4 we then return to the
theoretical perspective to shed more light on the particular dilemmas and paradoxes that, arguably,
are an important parameter in explaining the appeal and striking proliferation of these forms of
environmental governance.
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3. Practices of Performative Environmental Governance
Prominent examples demonstrating how modern environmental governance has moved,
vertically and horizontally, beyond conventional state-centered government are (a) international
climate summits such as the United Nations Climate Change Conferences, (b) the involvement
of market actors into environmental policy-making, and (c) the official recognition of civil society
initiatives and niche movements as pioneers, drivers, and laboratories of societal change towards
sustainability. Referring to different levels of policy-making, these examples may be used to illustrate
how contemporary forms of environmental governance can be investigated through the lens of
performance. An exhaustive analysis cannot be offered within the confines of this article. Yet it
is certainly possible to show how, in all these cases, the different dimensions of performance
conceptualized above are applicable. They may be distinguished analytically but are in practice
tightly interconnected. Table 1 below selectively summarizes some key aspects.
Table 1. Types of performance in three examples of environmental governance.
Type Global ClimateSummitry
Engagement of Market
Actors Niche Movements
Type A
delivering output
international agreements
for effective climate
protection; empowering
democratic actors
greening capitalism;
empowering consumers
finding innovative social
practices; increasing
democratic engagement
and legitimacy
Type B1.1
tool for deception
display of commitment
to mollify public
concerns
greenwashing
unsustainable practices;
enhancing sales and
consumption
lifestyle choice and mere
display of eco-social
commitments
Type B1.2
prefiguring ends,
generating momentum
visualizing common
goals; facilitating
sustained policy
collaboration
envisaging a socially and
ecologically benign
market economy and
consumer culture
anticipating and
promoting possible
alternatives to the
prevailing order of
unsustainability
Type B2
self-illusioning, coping
with irresolvable
dilemmas
addressing
socio-ecological
commitments without
jeopardizing opposite
objectives
responding to conflicting
interests of market actors;
experiencing the
reconciliation of
consumer lifestyle and
eco-social commitments
managing the tensions
between the desire for a
fully sustainable
existence and the
commitment to
contemporary lifestyles
(a) International climate politics under the roof of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change is one of the best-known examples of international environmental governance.
In terms of performance as the delivery of policy outputs (Type A), the annual Conferences of Parties
(COPs) seem promising because these gatherings are prepared and attended by international leaders,
scientific experts, climate activists, and a wide range of non-governmental organizations, all protesting
their commitment to fast, coordinated, and effective climate action [47,48]. At the same time, however,
such summits may also be portrayed as performance in the theatrical sense (Type B). They may suitably
be described as symbolic politics (B1), firstly, because the 1.5 or 2 ◦C limit itself has acquired the status
of a political symbol that helps to visualize something that is highly abstract and well beyond human
capacities of perception: a relatively safe level of change in global average temperatures compared to
pre-industrial levels. Secondly, the regular climate summits also help to maintain the international
diplomatic infrastructure and to uphold the political momentum even in periods when factual progress
is difficult to achieve. In both these respects, international climate summitry is symbolic politics in the
prefigurative and mobilizing sense (B1.2) [49]. Yet it may also be understood as symbolic politics in
the deceptive and manipulative sense (B1.1) [50]. In fact, UN climate summits have been criticized
as professionally staged media events and costly and eco-politically ineffective—in terms of the CO2
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emissions they cause, even damaging—public relations exercises, providing international lobby groups
with an exceptional opportunity to exert their influence and world leaders with a stage to make big
promises which they neither can, nor perhaps even want to, fulfill [51].
The 2015 Paris Agreement, for example, that fails to specify any legally binding policy measures
but was still presented to the world as a major climate-political achievement [52], may be seen to
corroborate the view that international climate summitry is, more than anything, a strategic tool that
economic and political elites use to mollify the concerns of the international public whilst closely
protecting their respective interests [53]. Yet this interpretation in terms of ruthless power elites
conspiring against helpless populations and the planet at large fails to take into account that the
negotiating parties may well be very genuinely committed to reaching an effective agreement but
find themselves caught up in the dilemma that it is extremely difficult to translate the abstract 2 ◦C
target into nationally acceptable and internationally interlocking action plans [54]. Furthermore,
all national governments have to accommodate a range of different state goals that are often mutually
incommensurable already at the national not to mention international or global level. Put differently,
national governments are subject to—and powerfully blocked by—the incompatibility of a range of
imperatives that are all equally categorical.
The interpretation of internal climate summitry in terms of simulative politics (B2) takes account
of these dilemmas. From this perspective, these high profile events may be understood as an
opportunity for policy-makers to articulate their genuine and serious commitment to the goal of
environmental sustainability and provide evidence that they are pursuing this goal at the highest
possible level and in cooperation with the widest possible range of stakeholders—while avoiding,
or at least postponing, any detrimental implications for their other, equally serious commitments.
The same applies to the wide range of other actors attending such summits, all of whom share the
desire to demonstrate and experience their environmental values but also have to accommodate other
commitments. It even extends to those non-participants who join into celebrating outcomes such as
the Paris Treaty as a major eco-political achievement—relieved that a solution has been found that
does not directly affect their personal value preferences and lifestyle choices (B2.1). Seen through the
lens of simulative politics, their intentions do not appear immoral or malicious. However, these actors
and audiences are experiencing inescapable dilemmas and have to find ways in which they might
cope with unmanageable paradoxes (B2.2).
(b) Close co-operation with market actors, ranging from large international corporations right
down to individual consumers, is another pillar of modern environmental governance. Traditionally,
the interests of these actors were seen as diametrically opposed to those of environmentalists, and big
companies as well as consumers were regarded as primary targets of state-centered regulatory
politics. More recently, however, major corporations have been working closely with state agencies,
expert bodies, and environmental NGOs to reduce the environmental impact of production, distribution,
and consumption processes. State regulation has been supplemented or even replaced by schemes
of voluntary self-monitoring. Initiatives such as Global Compact under the roof of the UN or the
Eco Management and Audition Scheme of the European Union foster the ethical self-management of
companies. Corporate Environmental Responsibility (CER) has become a prominent part of the mission
statements of all major firms and of their brand-management and public relations efforts [55]. At the
other end of the market, these new corporate efforts are complemented by a shift in consumer behavior,
in particular segments, towards environmentally and ethically oriented product choices [56–58].
Looking from the perspective of problem-solving capacity, the engagement of market actors into
collaborative networks of environmental governance may convey considerable hope: Self-monitoring
schemes, Corporate Social and Environmental Responsibility schemes, and the related reporting
requirements may help companies to reorient their unsustainable practices and enable other
stakeholders to assess the environmental credentials of companies. They potentially empower
consumers to exert some market pressure; businesses, in turn, can use their CER and CSR efforts to
strengthen their relative position vis-à-vis less green competitors; and NGOs can provide evidence
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that, in addition to mere protesting, they also engage in devising constructive solutions to eco-political
challenges [59,60]. Overall, the engagement of market actors in networks of collaborative governance
may, therefore, be an effective tool for reconfiguring the established logic of consumer capitalism.
The lens of symbolic politics, in contrast, suggests that the involvement of market actors performs
mainly in the sense of facilitating corporate strategies of deception. On the one hand, the enrolment of
diverse market actors may, of course, be symbolic in the prefigurative sense: It may help to envisage
the goal of a comprehensive transformation of society, generate momentum for this project, and subtly
create the conditions for its success [61]. On the other hand, however, the inclusion of market actors
into networks of governance not only entails the risk of regulatory capture [62], i.e., of those whose
behavior is to be regulated gaining major influence on, or even control over, those who are supposed
to set the rules. However, in practice, CER and CSR schemes are often merely a tool companies use to
greenwash their public image [63,64]. As a marketing strategy, they are designed to further increase
sales and consumption; thus, they sustain rather than reconfigure the destructive principles of capital
accumulation, social inequality, commodification, and so forth [65].
Green consumerism, in turn, is symbolic in that it tends to be selective and focus on very
particular products. This may, of course, anticipate and signal commitment to a much more
thoroughgoing transformation of established consumption practices [66], but more often it is a
means of articulating a specific self-understanding, social status, or lifestyle. Most importantly,
green consumerism is rarely about consuming less or even abandoning the shopping and consumer
culture [67,68]. Instead, neoliberal governments, while trying to offload their eco-political obligations
to “responsible consumers” [69–71], see green consumerism as a means to open up new markets
and stimulate green growth [72]. Supposedly responsible, green consumer choices may well
be ecologically counter-productive, for example, if they merely ennoble ecologically damaging
practices (e.g., voluntary carbon surcharge for air tickets) or if environmentalism incentivizes
additional purchases (e.g., supposedly eco-friendly e-bikes) or premature product replacement
(e.g., slightly cleaner diesel cars) [73,74]. Thus, just as CER and CSR never unhinge the logic
of capitalism, green consumerism rarely suspends the logic of mass consumption and resource
overuse [75,76]. Hence, the assertion that consumer pressure can make a significant and lasting
contribution to a socio-ecological sustainability transformation remains questionable.
The lens of simulative politics, however, adds a further layer to the understanding of both
corporate environmentalism and green consumerism. More specifically, it suggests that these two
dimensions of modern environmental governance have become important because they enable
businesses and consumers alike to manage the diverse and often conflicting pressures with which
they find themselves confronted. CER and CSR schemes help corporations to respond to civil society
critiques, innovation pressures, government agendas, and shareholder interests at the same time
by offering multi-layered narratives that each stakeholder group may read selectively from their
particular perspective. Green consumerism helps modern citizens to hold on to their established
patterns of self-realization, further pursue their lifestyle preferences, and articulate their individual
identities [77,78]. More specifically, it allows them to act and experience themselves not only as
individualized consumers but also as socially and ecologically oriented and responsible citizens [56].
Thus, corporate environmentalism and green consumerism both respond to the problems of highly
differentiated selves and societies. They perform something theatrically that in conditions of increasing
complexity and accelerated change can no longer be achieved by other means: They bridge the
“yawning gap between the right of self-assertion and the capacity to control the social setting which
render such self-assertion feasible or unrealistic” [79] (p. 38).
(c) Complementing the engagement of market actors, civil society initiatives and local niche
movements, too, have acquired an important role in modern environmental governance. They have
been recognized as actors which, as pioneers of change, might make a substantial contribution to
the great transformation to sustainability [61]. Initiatives such as renewable energy cooperatives,
community-supported agriculture projects, repair cafés, alternative housing collectives, food- and
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tool-sharing platforms, or local currencies flourish in a realm beyond both the market and the state
and can function as laboratories for experimental social practices and societal change. There is
an expectation that they can substantially increase the democratic performance and boost the
problem-solving capacity of local communities and society at large [7,80]. Beyond their effects in the
immediate present, they also perform in the sense that they symbolically anticipate a radically different
society. Indeed, this prefigurative aspect is central to the transformative potential of civil society-driven
initiatives. As the hegemony of market-liberal thinking renders it ever more difficult to even envisage
any alternative to the consumer capitalist order of unsustainability, these niche movements help not
only to imagine but actually experience alternative practices and socio-ecological relations [81–83].
A number of observers have pointed out, however, that practitioners within niche movements
often remain rather ambivalent about really abandoning the established practices and lifestyles of
unsustainability. In fact, activists often refrain from adopting a radically critical or antagonist stance
towards the existing political-economic regime and conceive of their alternative practices not as a radical
political project but the playful effort to do something good [7,84]. This raises questions about the extent
to which these initiatives and niche movements can really be regarded as pioneers of a radical societal
transformation. In fact, studies trying to compare the environmental impact of different social milieus
have revealed that individuals belonging to the well-educated, post-materialist, creative milieus—which
provide an important reservoir for alternative niche movements [85]—often remain strongly attached
to mobility practices, communication technologies, domestic accommodation and living patterns,
and so forth, which are closely associated with the “imperial mode of living” [86] and the culture
of “externalization” [87] prevailing in the societal mainstream [88,89]. Put differently, the engagement in
niche movements and the experience of alternative practices do not necessarily signal much commitment
to a profound transformation of the prevailing order of unsustainability, but may—in a rather apolitical
and consumerist manner—simply be an ingredient of a particular personal image or lifestyle [57,77].
From a traditional critical perspective, such ambivalence may then be read as inconsistency,
false posturing, fake, and performance, signaling dishonesty or a lack of genuine eco-social
commitment that may be morally condemned (symbolic politics). Yet, if conceptualized in terms
of simulative politics, this simultaneity of seemingly incompatible practices and value-orientations
may be interpreted as a performative strategy to deal with complexities—to cope with the paradoxes
and make sense of the irresolvable contradictions of contemporary consumer societies. From this
perspective, the engagement in niche movements might be interpreted as the attempt of individuals to
recuperate an autonomous space for expressing their environmental and democratic values [45,90].
In these arenas they can experience some degree of sovereignty with regard to everyday needs such as
food, energy, or clothing, whilst fully acknowledging that in other respects their everyday conduct may
be much less self-determined—and sustainable. Thus, participation in a food cooperative or alternative
housing project may well articulate a serious pledge to a sustainable way of living [7,86,91]. However,
rather than anticipating a full and consistent transformation of a personal—and then societal—way of
life, it may then be read as a performative and experiential strategy for the management of inescapable
dilemmas and irresolvable contradictions.
4. Explaining the Appeal of Participatory Governance
The above illustrations are only indicative, but they clearly demonstrate how the multi-layered
concept of performance developed in Section 2 facilitates a much more nuanced interpretation of
actual practices of environmental governance than is offered in much of the mainstream literature.
Yet, to understand the particular appeal and explain the striking proliferation of these new practices,
further analysis is required of the distinctive condition and dilemmas of eco-politics in liberal consumer
democracies to which practices of simulative politics, in particular, seem to respond. More systematic
attention is needed to the multiple problems of contemporary eco-politics and to the above assertion
that contemporary consumer societies lack the political will and ability to resolve their multiple
sustainability crisis.
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This failure of contemporary consumer societies to achieve a socio-ecological transformation
is commonly explained by referring to the institutionalized interests and overwhelming power of
economic elites who effectively block any substantial deviation from the established order and pattern
of development and who systematically deny citizens their right to self-determination and a good life in
conditions of social justice and ecological integrity [12,92,93]. This argument captures part of the truth
but ignores the eco-political predicament of liberal consumer democracies—which may, ultimately,
be a more significant cause of both the difficulty to achieve structural socio-ecological change and
the striking proliferation of governance arrangements. As signaled above, contemporary consumer
democracies are caught up in the trilemma that (a) despite the wealth of scientific information,
the normative foundations for transformative action are becoming ever more uncertain and unreliable;
(b) despite unprecedented levels of environmental awareness and commitment, there is neither a
political actor who could effectively drive and coordinate transformative action, nor a promising
political strategy; and (c) in contemporary consumer societies prevailing notions of freedom, identity,
self-realization, and a good life are ever more incompatible with ideals of environmental integrity,
social justice, and democracy—but are regarded, nevertheless, as non-negotiable and defended with
great determination.
(a) For a long time, environmental movements had assumed that environmental problems
and the need for transformative action are essentially self-evident and that campaigns of public
information and education would, eventually, generate the support required for effective action
against unsustainability. They tended to disregard that there is a major difference between empirical
facts and social concerns [94,95] and that environmental politics is primarily about the latter rather
than the former [96–98]. Yet, as processes of modernization rendered contemporary societies ever
more complex, giving rise to an ever larger number of perspectives onto reality and to competing
views of what ought to be sustained, for whom, for which reasons, and so forth, the normative
foundations of environmental politics became increasingly uncertain. Moreover, the growing wealth
of scientific knowledge and information, unexpectedly, triggered disorientation at least as much as
they were politically mobilizing and enabling [78]. In addition, the acceleration of societal change,
the unpredictability of societal development, and the complexity of international relations have a
paralyzing effect. When neoliberals and right-wing populists then started to amplify alleged scientific
disagreement, for example, about anthropogenic climate change [99], discredited the public media as
fake news, and replaced public deliberation and rational argument by fabricated fears and alternative
facts, it became virtually impossible to achieve and maintain agreement about eco-political problems,
priorities, objectives, and strategies.
(b) As regards the primary driver and political strategy for the socio-ecological transformation of
contemporary societies, environmental movements, whilst strongly relying on the state to provide
and enforce a suitable framework of laws, had always been skeptical of the state, which they
thought was pre-occupied, more than anything, with the reproduction of power and, beyond that,
too closely entangled with business interests. Hence, environmentalists preferred to rely, instead,
on civil society’s capacity for self-organization and believed that the thorough democratization
of every dimension of societal affairs would be a promising strategy to achieve social justice and
equality, secure the integrity of the natural environment, and guarantee a good life for all. Yet,
in increasingly complex societies, democratic procedures proved, in many respects, to be not conducive
to the attainment of ecological goals because, for example, they are very long-winded, focused on
short-term electoral returns, based on the principle of compromise, and always rather limited in
terms of their geographical reach [100]. Moreover, civil society and the ethos of engagement and
self-responsibility were increasingly captured by neoliberals and their activating state, which sought
to devolve former state responsibilities. Furthermore, in line with a notable decline of public
confidence in democracy, more generally [18,19], environmentalists, too, began to suspect that there
might, in fact, be an underlying “complicity” between democracy and unsustainability [29,101]
(p. 985): After all, the demands of ever larger parts of (international) society for a good life
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and their fair share of societal wealth are, and have always been, a powerful driver of ever
more economic growth and socio-ecological exploitation [27,28]. And with right-wing populist
movements powerfully demanding—bottom up—less stringent environmental regulations and
laws [102], civil society and democratic approaches seem to be becoming even less suitable for a
profound socio-ecological transformation. Yet, an alternative actor and more promising strategy is not
easily in sight. Paternalistic nudging approaches [103], for example, or growth-oriented Green New Deal
scenarios [104,105] each have their own problems attached to them.
(c) In terms of their prevailing notions of freedom, self-realization, and a fulfilling life, modern
consumer societies have acquired value preferences, aspirations and lifestyles that are categorically
incompatible with the principles of sustainability. In fact, with the pluralization and flexibilization
of traditional notions of subjectivity and identity, with consumerism having emerged as the primary
mode of self-realization and self-expression, with the massive geographical expansion of individual
lifeworlds (mobility, product sourcing, and waste disposal), and the steady acceleration of innovation
and consumption cycles, unsustainability has in many ways become a constitutive principle of
modern identity, lifestyles, and society. It is ever more difficult to conceptualize it as an unintended,
undesirable, and potentially amendable side effect. Instead, the subjectivities and patterns of
self-realization of the global consumer elites, in particular, are—in the era of flexibility, innovation,
and planned obsolescence—unsustainable by intention and design [29,90]. Despite all narratives
of sustainability and a socio-ecological transformation, contemporary individuals and societies at
large are incrementally emancipating themselves from established social and ecological imperatives
(e.g., social equality, solidarity and redistribution, protection of natural habitats, bio-diversity,
and human rights agendas), which from the perspective of contemporary value preferences,
ambitions and necessities seem unacceptably restrictive [46,100]. Instead, contemporary consumer
societies are firmly committed to value preferences, lifestyles, and social aspirations, which are widely
known and accepted to be socially and ecologically destructive [86,87] but are still adamantly defended.
Therefore, contemporary consumer societies are confronted with the dilemma that, in the new
geological era of the Anthropocene, radical transformative action, “planetary management” [23],
and “earth systems governance” [24,106] may seem more urgently required than ever, but the
normative foundations for such an agenda are more uncertain than ever, there is no primary actor nor
a promising political strategy for any significant transformation, and the prevailing and sacrosanct
notions of freedom, self-determination, and self-realization are firmly based on the principle of
sustained unsustainability.
Exactly this is, arguably, where modern forms of governance as a decentralized and collaborative
mode of addressing environmental concerns come in, and performance as a form of action that
delivers to the specific needs of modern societies. In this particular constellation, contemporary forms
of environmental governance are good with regard to all three dimensions of the eco-political
disability of modern societies: With the absence of reliable eco-political norms, they deal
by delegating the issue to self-regulating entities, responsible consumers, and their voluntary
self-commitment, thereby alleviating the problems governments and policy-makers have with defining,
politically legitimating, and enforcing particular standards and laws. They address the lack of
a promising actor and strategy for transformative change by setting up new—and supposedly
capable—policy networks and charging them with the task to negotiate and implement an inclusive
social contract for sustainability. As regards the value preferences of contemporary individuals
and consumer society at large, these new forms of governance are good in that they allow for the
articulation of eco-social commitments and for the desire to maintain the established principles of
unsustainability. They provide arenas for the experience of eco-political agency, efficacy, and integrity,
but are voluntary and non-committing and can be disposed of as and when required. In none of these
respects, modern arrangements of environmental governance resolve the problems in the sense of
effecting structural change to the prevailing socio-metabolic regime, but in all of them, they address
them and respond to the particular needs of modern consumer societies. They are a performative
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response to the multi-dimensional disability of contemporary eco-politics and to the unwillingness
of liberal consumer societies to depart from their established culture of sustainability. In exactly this
sense, they are a societal practice for the collaborative management of sustained unsustainability.
5. Conclusions
In the existing literature, the proliferation of decentralized and participatory forms of
environmental governance has been investigated, and their performance assessed, from a number
of different perspectives. In this article we have taken a socio-theoretically informed approach
and have found that interpreting modern environmental governance as performance in the sense
of simulative politics makes a major contribution to understanding these policy arrangements.
Further research is required to empirically apply the conceptual framework developed here much
more systematically. Yet it has already become clearly visible how a multi-layered understanding of
performance facilitates an analysis that is more nuanced than both the celebration of these decentralized,
collaborative practices as a promising strategy for the great transformation to sustainability and the
critique of environmental governance as being merely performative rather than genuinely committed
and effective. Blühdorn has argued that the concept of sustainability, which retains its lead position
in public discourse on eco-politics and -policy even though very few observers still regard it as a
promising leitmotiv for the great transformation of modern consumer societies, is so successful not
although but precisely because it is highly unlikely to disrupt the order of consumer capitalism [107].
Following the same line of thought, we have argued here that decentralized and participatory
forms of governance proliferate not although but exactly because they do not perform in terms
of a structural transformation of modern societies. We have suggested that the governance approach
to environmental policy-making has become so prominent because it corresponds very closely to the
particular concerns, preferences, and dilemmas of contemporary consumer democracies. From this
perspective, environmental governance is not “the totality of instruments and mechanisms available to
collectively steer” [2] (p. 8) their socio-ecological transformation but to collaboratively manage their
politics of unsustainability.
More traditional analyses in terms of performance have either analyzed environmental governance
as effective and efficient tools for resolving sustainability problems, or as deceptive strategies of elites
that urgently need to be replaced by the authentic kind of eco-politics which scientists, activists,
and eco-movements demand—and supposedly want. While we acknowledge that these approaches
have a substantive contribution to make, we argue that in contemporary consumer societies things are
more complex than these approaches suggest. The curious proliferation—and lasting significance—of
environmental governance can be explained much more plausibly by adding the perspective of
simulative politics: Practices of environmental governance provide arenas in which the commitment
to eco-political values and transformative change can be articulated, and in which actors can present
and experience themselves as being fully committed to social and ecological sustainability, whilst at
the same time also holding on to, and adamantly defending, their socially and ecologically destructive
consumer preferences, habits, and lifestyles.
Two predictable objections to this interpretation of environmental governance concern, firstly,
the empirical evidence supporting its claims and, secondly, its political use-value, be it for official
policy-makers or social movement activists. As regards the empirical evidence, we are making
no claim to offering a full and exhaustive account, of current forms of environmental governance.
Drawing on sociological and eco-political theory, we are offering a conceptual framework for analyzing
contemporary practices of governance and for explaining their appeal and proliferation. Its objective is
to help make sense of seemingly inefficient eco-political practices and their proliferation. The suggested
framework can be assessed on the basis of its theoretical consistency, practical applicability,
and explanatory power—as demonstrated in the discussion of various examples. However, it is not
possible to support our hypotheses with empirical evidence in the positivist sense—not least because
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this interpretative framework operates at the macro-theoretical level of overall societal development
rather than that of particular actors and their conscious strategic actions.
As regards the suggested framework’s actual use-value, this is by no means confined to the
theoretical and explanatory dimension. In the first instance, its emphasis is, indeed, on better
understanding the eco-political conduct of liberal consumer societies. At this stage, it does not
offer suggestions for alternative policy approaches which might perform better—not least because,
it remains itself caught up in the normative dilemma it diagnoses. Accordingly, it confines itself to
investigating what modern consumer societies conceptualize as good environmental governance,
and why they might be doing so. Policy-makers and activists may well find this unsatisfactory
and ask for more: The former rarely appreciate academic research that does not provide them with
practical policy recommendations, and the latter may complain that the analysis undertaken here
not only undermines the efforts of those who seek to unmask what they see as merely performative
strategies of the elites, but actually subjects these well-intentioned critics to the meta-critique that
their discourse, too, may have to be read as a performance of particular values and commitments,
which, ultimately, itself contributes to the collaborative management of unsustainability. This, in turn,
then raises the larger question whether in modern consumer societies the vicious circle of simulation
can be transcended at all, and whether the analysis presented here may, ultimately, be little more
than the socio-theoretical equivalent of the neoliberal principle of TINA (there is no alternative): a
social-theoretical justification of the prevailing politics of unsustainability.
This is explicitly not what this article seeks to deliver! Our analysis is far from being indifferent
to the social and ecological disasters implied in the politics of sustained unsustainability. We firmly
hold on to the belief that a radical socio-ecological transformation is urgently required. For exactly
this reason, we are keen to demonstrate that the limitations of modern forms of environmental
governance cannot be overcome by involving yet another stakeholder or adding yet another layer
of deliberation. Instead, the inability to achieve the great transformation must be traced back to
the particular condition of modern societies in which unsustainability has metamorphosed from an
unforeseen side effect into a constitutive principle of contemporary subjectivities, lifestyles, and society
at large. The mounting pressure for quick and pragmatic policy suggestions—which necessarily have
to discount this aspect—is itself a constitutive element of the politics of unsustainability. Even though
the analysis presented here may, at first sight, appear politically unconstructive or even disabling,
the critical deconstruction of the prevailing narratives and practices contributing to the collaborative
management of sustained unsustainability is, quite clearly, an essential and indispensable step for any
socio-ecological transformation of modern liberal consumer democracies.
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